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Abstract
Decision makers increasingly rely on algorithmic risk scores to determine access to binary treatments
including bail, loans, and medical interventions. In these settings, we reconcile two fairness criteria
that were previously shown to be in conflict: calibration and error rate equality. In particular, we
derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of calibrated scores that yield classifications
achieving equal error rates at any given group-blind threshold. We then present an algorithm that
searches for the most accurate score subject to both calibration and minimal error rate disparity.
Applied to the COMPAS criminal risk assessment tool, we show that our method can eliminate error
disparities while maintaining calibration. In a separate application to credit lending, we compare our
procedure to the omission of sensitive features and show that it raises both profit and the probability
that creditworthy individuals receive loans.
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1 Introduction
Today’s algorithms reach deep into decisions that guide our lives, from loan approvals to
medical treatments to foster care placements. Making these high-impact decisions fairly
is an effort undergoing public scrutiny. In one investigation, ProPublica showed that an
algorithm operating in the U.S. criminal justice system, COMPAS, discriminated against
black defendants by misclassifying them as high-risk at significantly higher rates than white
defendants [2]. On the other hand, it was later revealed that the same algorithm did satisfy a
different form of fairness: calibration of scores for both black and white defendants [10]. This
meant that on average, a defendant’s score reflected the same risk level regardless of race.
Researchers have sought to explain how a screening algorithm like COMPAS can satisfy
one natural notion of fairness but not another, spurring a research agenda to characterize how
definitions of algorithmic fairness relate to one another. Multiple studies in this literature
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proved that algorithms face inevitable tradeoffs whenever they predict on groups that have
different average outcomes [15, 5, 4, 7, 14]. These influential “impossibility results” have
underscored the need for practitioners to target certain fairness criteria at the expense of
others.
We show that it is in fact possible to reconcile the two notions of fairness that gained
influence following the COMPAS investigation: calibration and equal error rates. In important
previous work, these two criteria were proven to be mutually incompatible when both are
applied to a risk score [15, 22] and when both are applied to a classifier [5]. Naturally these
findings were interpreted as evidence that calibration and equal error rates are incompatible
altogether [1]. It was therefore speculated that COMPAS’s enforcement of score calibration
made its error rate imbalances inevitable [5].
In contrast, we show that both calibration and equal error rates can be reconciled in
COMPAS and in many other real-world settings where protected groups have different
mean outcomes. We relax the mathematical tension between these two fairness criteria
by separately enforcing calibration on the score and equal error rates on the corresponding
classifier. In particular, we prove that it is possible to design calibrated scores that yield
equal error rate classifications at group-blind cutoffs, and we provide a method to do so with
maximal accuracy. Furthermore, we develop practical extensions of the method, such as
showing how to enforce weaker notions of the equal error rate criterion (like the “equality
of opportunity” criterion of Hardt et al. [12]) and how to accommodate multiple protected
subgroups.
Our framework and method can be applied to two settings. In the first, we consider
the problem of providing risk scores to a profit-maximizing third-party agent, such as a
lender, who then uses them to assign binary treatments, such as loan approvals and denials.
We illustrate how to construct calibrated scores that lead this profit-maximizer to make
classifications satisfying equal error rates. In the second setting, we consider risk assessments
like COMPAS that output both scores and classification recommendations, and show that
the scores can be made to satisfy calibration while the classification recommendations can
be made to satisfy equal error rates.
This paper supports growing evidence on the complementary relationship between data
quality and fairness objectives [11, 8, 9, 6, 13, 14]. In particular, we show that access to
sufficiently informative features is required to satisfy our fairness criteria, and that the
feasible set of solutions grows with the informativeness of the data. In an empirical credit
lending example, we compare our method to a commonly practiced strategy of data omission.
It yields higher lender profit while also improving access to loans for creditworthy applicants
in all groups.
The results proceed as follows. In Section 2, we prove that it is possible to construct
calibrated scores that lead to equal error rate classifications and we precisely characterize
when such scores exist. In Section 3, we propose an algorithm that produces the most
accurate possible score satisfying the fairness criteria and minimizing the decision-maker’s
errors. We apply our method in Section 4 to two empirical settings. We first assess its
performance in helping a lender screen loan applicants of various educational backgrounds.
We also apply the method to the COMPAS criminal risk assessment tool, where we show
that our procedure can eliminate error rate imbalances in risk classifications while preserving
calibration of scores.
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1.1 Related Work
Our paper belongs to a body of work that studies the mathematical relationships between
various individual and group measures of fairness. Calibration and equal error rates have
been formalized and extensively studied in prior work [22, 12, 15, 5]. In particular, Kleinberg
et al. [15] and Pleiss et al. [22] show that these criteria are incompatible when applied to a
risk score and Chouldechova [5] shows the corresponding result for binary classifiers. We
consider a natural variation of the problem where we ask whether a calibrated score can,
upon being supplied to a rational third-party, lead to equal-error predictions. Surprisingly,
we find that the answer is yes.
Our work also contributes to a recent strand of the literature which studies how algorithmic
prediction can interact with self-interested decision makers, bridging the classical problem of
prediction with the traditionally economic problem of information design [20, 24]. From this
perspective, we study the existence of scores that lead to desirable equilibria: those in which
the final decision rule is group-blind due to calibration, and the resulting decisions satisfy
equal error rates.
Finally, we believe it is important to emphasize that the two fairness criteria we study do
not encompass all notions of fairness. Tradeoffs remain between these criteria and others. For
example, enforcing equal error rates requires that the classifications’ positive and negative
predictive values will be unequal across groups, meaning that one groups’ scores would
carry greater signal to the decision-maker than the others’ [5]. In addition, equal error
rate classifications will generically require changes to the Bayes’ optimal classifications, and
enforcing calibration does not diminish this requirement [6].
Decisions for how to prioritize fairness conditions are likely to vary by application going
forward. We hope that by clarifying the precise relationship between two influential criteria,
we can facilitate these decisions, and that in settings where calibration and equal error




Let us consider a triple (Y, X, A) on a common probability space P, where Y ∈ {0, 1} is an
outcome variable, X ∈ Rd is a vector of features, and A ∈ {H, L} is a protected attribute
differentiating two groups with unequal base rates µA = E[Y |A] of the outcome,
µL < µH . (1)
Our goal is to estimate a score function p̂ ≡ p̂(X, A) ∈ [0, 1] that predicts Y with maximum
accuracy subject to the constraints of calibration and equal error rates. Specifically, we hand




0 y = ŷ
1 y > ŷ
k y < ŷ,
(2)
where k > 0 is the relative cost of false positive classifications. Note that any loss function
that is minimized when y = ŷ is equivalent to ℓ after an affine transformation.
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Let us suppose the decision-maker might be able to observe group affiliation A in addition
to p̂. To ensure that classifications are based only on p̂ and not on A, we constrain p̂ to
satisfy calibration within groups,
E[Y |A, p̂] = E[Y |p̂] = p̂. (3)
If (3) holds, the decision-maker’s expected loss given p̂ and A becomes
E[ℓ(Y, ŷ)|p̂, A] = p̂(1 − ŷ) + k(1 − p̂)ŷ. (4)
This expected loss is minimized with a cutoff decision rule that is independent of group
affiliation A,
ŷ = 1{p̂ ≥ p̄}, (5)
where the cutoff p̄ = k/(k+1) is fixed by the decision-maker’s loss function.
Our second condition constrains ŷ to satisfy equal error rates, ensuring that the classifica-
tion only depends on the group through the target variable. Following the decision rule (5),
we may write this as
(1{p̂ ≥ p̄} ⊥⊥ A) | Y. (6)
Our calibration and equal error rate conditions are summarized by (3) and (6), respectively.
2.2 Relation to Impossibility Results
We first introduce a general impossibility result, relate it to previous work, and show where
our assumptions diverge to make our proposed criteria satisfiable. The following theorem
proves that a single algorithmic output Z cannot generally satisfy notions of both calibration
and equal error rates.
▶ Theorem 1. Let Y, A, and Z be random variables satisfying the following three conditions.
(i) (Y ⊥⊥ A) | Z,
(ii) (Z ⊥⊥ A) | Y,
(iii) P(A = H|Z), P(Y = 1|A, Z) ∈ (0, 1).
Then A and (Z, Y ) must be independent.
Proof. Suppose that (Y, A, Z) satisfy (i) (ii) and (iii). Assumption (iii) implies that the
law of (A, Y, Z) is strictly positive. By the Hammersley-Clifford theorem (see e.g. [18]), the
conditional independence relations are summarized by a graph on {Y, A, Z} where every
path from Y to A travels through Z, and every path from A to Z travels through Y . There
are only two graphs with this property:
A Z Y
A Z Y
In neither of these graphs does there exist a path from A to (Y, Z), so we conclude that A
and (Y, Z) must be independent for (i) (ii) and (iii) to simultaneously hold. ◀
Note that when A denotes group affiliation and Y denotes outcomes, (i) is a form of calibration
and (ii) is a form of the equal error rate condition. Assumption (iii) is a strong form of
predictive uncertainty that is generalized in the appendix. Thus the theorem shows that
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when there is predictive uncertainty and Y depends on A (i.e. when the base rates are
unequal), it is impossible for a single Z to satisfy both calibration and equal error rates.
For example, letting Z be a classifier recovers the result of Chouldechova that (i) equal
positive and negative predictive values are unachievable alongside (ii) equal error rates [5].
Meanwhile, letting Z be a risk score shows that (i) calibration is unachievable alongside (ii)
a condition that implies balance in the positive and negative class, similar to the result of
Kleinberg et al. [15].
Our own setting bypasses the mathematical impossibility described in Theorem 1 by
imposing constraints on two separate algorithmic outputs rather than one. We require (i)
calibration from the scores p̂ and (ii) equal error rates from the resulting classifications
ŷ = 1{p̂ ≥ p̄}.
2.3 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
In this section we characterize exactly when there exists a calibrated p̂ that leads to equal
error rate classifications ŷ at the cutoff p̄. Our conditions can be easily checked in a given
setting, and they are shown to depend on the informativeness of the features X.
The graphical framework in this section builds on methods developed by Hardt et al. [12].
All the necessary and sufficient conditions will be illustrated in R2, with true positive rates on
the vertical axis and false positive rates on the horizontal. The feasible region will be the set
in R2 corresponding to error rates achievable by an equal error rate classifier ŷ = 1{p̂ ≥ p̄}
where p̂ is calibrated.
We first study the entire set corresponding to equal error rate classifiers, without regard
to calibration or the decision-maker’s cutoff p̄. Then we study the entire set corresponding
to classifiers that can be based on the cutoff p̄ applied to calibrated scores, without regard
to the equal error rate condition. Finally, we prove that the intersection of these two sets
determines feasibility of enforcing both conditions, and we characterize when the intersection
is nonempty.
2.3.1 Classifiers Satisfying Equal Error Rates
We wish to identify the entire set of error rates in R2 achievable by classifiers with equal
error rates. Hardt et al. [12] succeeded in doing so, and we review and adapt their results in
this subsection. To lay the groundwork for the geometric reasoning to follow, we first denote




P(ŷ = 1|Y = 0, A), P(ŷ = 1|Y = 1, A)
)
.
We may now define the set of achievable error rates in R2. Let H be the set of all possibly
random classifiers h(X, A). The set of achievable error rates for group A is
S(A) = {α(ŷ, A) | ŷ = h(X, A), h ∈ H} ⊆ R2, (7)
and the set of achievable rates for all classifiers satisfying equal error rates is given by
S(L) ∩ S(H). To better understand this intersection, we characterize S(A) in terms of
Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curves following Hardt et al. [12]. By definition, an
ROC curve of a given score p traces the true and false positive rates associated with each
possible cutoff rule 1{p ≥ c} for c ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore it contains all points α(1{p ≥ c}, A).
With these tools in hand, we are ready to characterize the feasible set of rates S(A) for
group A.
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Figure 1 Achievable equal error rates (shaded).
Two pairs of ROC curves form the boundaries of
S(L) and S(H). Points in the intersection S(L)∩
S(H) correspond to equal error rate classifiers.





















Figure 2 Achievable equal error rates from
calibrated score at cutoff p̄ (shaded). The restric-
tions (11) correspond to half-spaces above the red
dashed lines.
▶ Proposition 2. Let p∗ = p∗(X, A) be the Bayes optimal score satisfying p∗ = E[Y |X, A],
i.e., the best score given our data. Then the set of achievable rates S(A) is exactly the convex
hull of the union of the group-A ROC curve of the best score p∗ and the group-A ROC curve
of the worst score 1 − p∗, i.e. the convex hull of{
α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A)
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ c ≤ 1}
∪
{
(1, 1) − α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A)
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ c ≤ 1} .
Figure 1 illustrates typical examples of S(L), S(H), and the intersection S(L) ∩ S(H)
which represents the rates achievable by equal error rate classifiers.
2.3.2 Classifiers Compatible with Calibration
We now put aside the equal error rate constraint and concentrate on identifying the entire
set of classifiers that are implementable with the cutoff p̄ applied to some calibrated scores p̂.
The set is characterized by the following proposition.
▶ Proposition 3. A classifier ŷ can be written as ŷ = 1{p̂ ≥ p̄} for some calibrated p̂ if and
only if its group-specific positive predictive values exceed p̄, and its group-specific negative
predictive values exceed 1 − p̄. In particular, for A ∈ {L, H},
P(Y = 1|ŷ = 1, A) ≥ p̄, P(Y = 0|ŷ = 0, A) > 1 − p̄. (8)
Proof. Suppose that ŷ = 1{p̂ ≥ p̄} where p̂ is calibrated. Then ŷ must satisfy the inequalities
P(Y = 1|ŷ = 1, A) = E[Y |p̂ ≥ p̄, A]
= E[p̂|p̂ ≥ p̄, A] ≥ p̄, (9)
P(Y = 1|ŷ = 0, A) = E[p̂|p̂ < p̄, A] < p̄. (10)
Therefore, if ŷ is based on a calibrated score p̂ at cutoff p̄, then it is necessary for the
group-specific positive and negative predictive values to exceed p̄ and (1 − p̄), respectively.
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Conversely, given any classifier ŷ that satisfies the inequalities (9) and (10), we can always
put
p̂(ŷ, A) = P(Y = 1|ŷ, A)
to obtain a calibrated score that takes just two possible values per group with the cutoff p̄
guaranteed to be between them. This choice of p̂ thus satisfies ŷ = 1{p̂ ≥ p̄} by construction.
◀
As we will see in the following subsection, this result lays the foundation for the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the satisfiability of our fairness criteria.
2.3.3 The Feasibility Region
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the following are equivalent:
(i) There exists a calibrated score p̂ such that ŷ = 1{p̂ ≥ p̄} satisfies equal error rates.
(ii) There exists a classifier ŷ satisfying equal error rates and (8).
In practice, we propose checking (ii) to identify whether (i) holds. To do so, we use Bayes’
rule to write (8) as group-specific restrictions on true and false positive rates so that we can
consider them in the same space as the equal error rate constraints given by Hardt et al. [12].
The following theorem and the accompanying Figure 2 indicate that each restriction (8)
corresponds to a half-space in R2, and that the feasibile region corresponds to the intersection
of those half-spaces with each other and with the equal error rates region S(L) ∩ S(H).
▶ Theorem 4. Let βA = µA/(1 − µA) denote the group-specific odds ratios, with βL < βH .
Then our fairness criteria are simultaneously satisfiable at cutoff p̄ if and only if there exists












We next provide easily checkable necessary and sufficient conditions for when the feasible
region is nonempty.
▶ Corollary 5. Let (ᾰ1, ᾰ2) denote the point at which the inequalities (11) hold with equality.
Our fairness criteria are simultaneously satisfiable at cutoff p̄ if and only if any of the
following holds: ᾰ1 ≤ 0, ᾰ1 ≥ 1, or both groups’ ROC curves corresponding to p∗ lie above
















We note that the feasible region depends on the decision-maker’s cutoff p̄, which in turn
depends on their relative valuation of false positive and false negative classifications, k. In
particular, when k is either very large or close to 0, the set of feasible error rates shrinks to
include only those corresponding to no positive classifications or no negative classifications.
Data quality also contributes to the feasibility of enforcing both fairness criteria, as
illustrated by Theorem 4 and Figure 2. Note that the intersection of the half-spaces defined
in (11) are fixed by given parameters: βL, βH , and p̄. Beyond these, what determines the
size of the feasible region is the height of the ROC curves.
Higher ROC curves correspond to more accurate predictions, which can be achieved by
including more informative features X. This expands the region S(H)∩S(L) and thus always
weakens the constraints dictating whether equal error rates and calibration are compatible
in a given setting. Therefore, increasing the quality of data that an algorithm can access
promotes our notions of fairness, whereas removing data compromises them.
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3 A Loss-Minimizing Algorithm
After checking that our fairness criteria are feasible in a given setting, a natural next step
is to search for the constrained optimal solution, i.e. to identify the most accurate score p̂
that minimizes the decision-maker’s loss subject to our fairness constraints. Our strategy
is to first estimate the most accurate score p∗ = E[Y |X, A] without regard to fairness, and
then to transform the estimate in two separate stages. First, we identify the error rates
that minimize loss subject to the fairness conditions (Section 3.1). Second, we identify the
MSE-minimizing calibrated scores p̂ that gives rise to those error rates at the decision-maker’s
cutoff p̄ (Section 3.2). Lastly, we lay out extensions of the algorithm that can accommodate
practical use cases (Section 3.3).
3.1 Stage 1: Error Rate Optimization
The first stage of the algorithm identifies feasible error rates that minimize the decision
maker’s loss.
Let R denote the set of points (α1, α2) in the feasible region, i.e. the pairs of error rates
in S(H) ∩ S(L) that satisfy (11). Note that R is necessarily convex, as it is the intersection
of four convex regions: S(H), S(L), and the half-spaces defined in (11). Moreover, according
to the decision-maker’s loss function, a classifier corresponding to error rates (α1, α2) obtains
expected loss
ℓ(α1, α2) ≡ kα1(1 − E[Y ]) + (1 − α2)E[Y ]. (13)
Thus, straightforward convex optimization will identify the error rates that minimize the
linear function ℓ over (α1, α2) ∈ R. The optimal error rates identified, z∗ = (α∗1, α∗2), will
be on the upper-left boundary of the feasible region in Figure 2, with the precise point
determined by the decision-maker’s relative preference k over false positive and false negative
classifications.
Algorithm Stage 1 Find loss-minimizing feasible error rates.
Input: Raw scores {p∗i }, labels {Yi}, group identities {Ai}, base rates µA, cutoff p̄, loss
parameter k.
Step 1: Define convex feasible region R by taking intersection of rates (α1, α2) in
S(L) ∩ S(H) that satisfy (11). To compute S(L) ∩ S(H), use {p∗i } to determine each
group’s ROC curves.
if R is empty then
Output: No feasible solution.
end if
Step 2: Minimize loss function (13) over (α1, α2) ∈ R.
Output: Optimal target rates (α∗1, α∗2) from Step 2.
▶ Remark 6. The sets S(L) and S(H) correspond to the Bayes optimal score p∗ = E[Y |X, A],
which needs to be estimated in practice. Given an estimated score p, we propose using a
holdout sample to first calibrate p and then perform our algorithm. The resulting scores will
satisfy the fairness criteria approximately by a law-of-large-numbers argument, where the
fidelity is determined solely by the size of the holdout sample (see e.g. [27]).
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3.2 Stage 2: Risk Score Optimization
Once a feasible set of error rates is chosen, the decision-maker’s expected loss is determined.
However, multiple choices of calibrated scores may achieve those target rates at the cutoff
p̄, and we expect that in practice, decision-makers would prefer more accurate scores. This
section thus describes a method to recover the MSE-minimizing score p̂ that implements the
target rates z∗ by solving a constrained optimal transport problem [21].
We base the method on the finding that the best p̂ satisfying the fairness criteria is
recoverable through post-processing the Bayes optimal score p∗ = E[Y |X, A]. We include
a proof for this in the appendix, following a similar argument of Hardt et al. [12]. In the
appendix we also discuss how our procedure can be thought of as finding the smallest
mean-preserving contraction of p∗ that yields the targeted error rates. Readers will note that
the post-processing procedure requires some randomization of input scores. We explore the
effects of the randomization empirically in our online appendix [23], and meanwhile highlight
that our algorithm’s accuracy objective limits the extent to which scores p∗ change.
Our method defines one linear program per group A and seeks the most accurate p̂A that
yields error rates at the cutoff p̄ given by
α(1{p̂A ≥ p̄}, A) = z∗ = (α∗1, α∗2).
For the remainder of the section, we simplify notation by suppressing A subscripts and note
that the procedure is performed once for each group A ∈ {H, L}.
Our approach will involve a transformation kernel, or transport map, that maps the
distribution of the most accurate estimate of p∗ to the distribution of our post-processed
p̂. We assume for simplicity that the p∗ estimate has already been calibrated, and that
it is discrete (which we justify in the appendix). In particular, p∗ takes N ordered values
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN ), each with probability mass given by s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ) where
∑
i si = 1.
Furthermore, we will denote the post-processed p̂ as taking those same discrete values p but
with different probability masses that we seek to optimize, f = (f1, f2, . . . , fN ).
We call T the matrix that maps probability masses from the discrete distribution of p∗
to that of p̂. In particular, with probability Tij , the kernel will map an individual with score
pi to the output score pj . Therefore, the probability distribution of p̂ will be determined by
T ⊤s = f. (14)
In order to produce probability distributions, T must be right-stochastic: elements must take
values between 0 and 1, and each row should sum to 1.
0 ≤ Tij ≤ 1 and
N∑
k=1
Tik = 1 ∀ i, j ∈ {1, . . . N}. (15)
According to our fairness criteria, we further constrain T . To ensure that p̂ will be calibrated,
we need the outcome of individuals assigned score fi to satisfy Y = 1 with probability pi.
Given our assumption that p∗ has itself been calibrated, this reduces to
N∑
i=1
Tijpisi = pjfj ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (16)
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Tij(1 − pi)si (1{pj ≥ p̄} − α∗1) = 0. (17)
Finally, we formulate an objective. Note that the mean-squared error of p̂ satisfies the
bias-variance decomposition
E[(p̂ − Y )2] = E[(p̂ − E[Y |X, A])2] + E[(Y − E[Y |X, A])2],
and thus the p̂ that minimizes the left hand side is obtained by minimizing the first term on
the right hand side. In particular, if the input score p∗ is E[Y |X, A], then the post-processed
score that minimizes mean-squared error will also minimize





Tij(pi − pj)2si. (18)
Furthermore, even if p∗ is not exactly equal to E[Y |X, A], the triangle inequality in L2(P)
implies
E[(p̂ − Y )2] 12 ≤ E[(p∗ − Y )2] 12 + E[(p̂ − p∗)2] 12 .
Thus, by minimizing the objective (18) we can effectively control the additional error due to
post-processing. Combining this with the above constraints yields a straightforward linear
program.
Algorithm Stage 2 For each group, find calibrated scores achieving target rates.
Input: Raw scores {p∗i }, number of bins N , target error rates from stage 1 of algorithm
(α∗1, α∗2), cutoff p̄.
Step 1: Produce discrete score approximation of p∗: label N ordered values (p1, p2, . . . , pN )
with masses (s1, s2, . . . , sN ).
Step 2: Find score transformation kernel T that minimizes (18) subject to the constraints
(14), (15), (16) and (17).
Step 3: Map each individual with given raw score to a new post-processed score, based
on probabilities given by kernel T .
Output: Scores p̂ from Step 3. By design these satisfy calibration and yield error rates
(α∗1, α∗2) at cutoff p̄.
3.3 Available Extensions
Our procedure can be modified to handle additional use cases. We can flexibly trade off the
fairness and accuracy objectives, minimize error disparities rather than eliminate them when
the feasible region is empty, accommodate a setting where the decision-maker’s cutoff p̄ is
estimated with error, and apply the procedure to more than two groups.
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3.3.1 Relaxing the fairness criteria
An alternative formulation of our algorithm can accommodate multiple cases encountered in
practice. By modifying Stage 1 to include a weighted error-rate penalty, users can flexibly
trade off the fairness and accuracy objectives, minimize error disparities rather than eliminate
them when the feasible region R is empty, and enforce just one error constraint as in the
“equality of opportunity” criterion of Hardt et al. [12]. In general, the more flexible procedure
will output group-specific optimal error rates: z∗L and z∗H . These group-specific targets are
then inputted into Stage 2 which is otherwise unchanged.
To modify Stage 1, first we define a broader domain for the algorithm to search over
in place of R. It contains all the error rates implementable by a calibrated score at the
decision-maker’s cutoff, according to the inequalities (11), without regard to equal error rates.
The domain is R(H) × R(L) where
R(A) =
{
(α1, α2) ∈ S(A)
∣∣∣∣ 1 − α21 − α1 < p̄/βA(1 − p̄) ≤ α2α1
}
. (19)
(Note that this is guaranteed to be nonempty, as it contains the error rates of the classifier
1{p∗ ≥ p̄}.) We also replace the loss function (13) with a generalized version that includes
both the decision-maker’s expected loss from the error rates as well as the groups’ rate
disparities. The new loss function is
γℓ(zL) + (1 − γ)ℓ(zH) + (zL − zH)⊤Λ(zL − zH) (20)
where ℓ(zA) is the decision-maker’s expected loss kα1A(1 − E[Y |A]) + (1 − α2A)E[Y |A] and
γ is the fraction of individuals in group L. Meanwhile, Λ is a positive semidefinite matrix
that provides the flexibility of varying the enforcement of minimal error rate differences. For
example, taking Λ = λI for arbitrarily large λ recovers the equal error rate solution when
the feasible region R is nonempty, and otherwise outputs the solution that minimizes error
rate disparities. Meanwhile a small choice of λ places relatively more weight on accuracy.
Alternatively, Λ could be chosen so that differences in the true and false positive rates are
weighted differently. For example, we can achieve equal true positive rates and allow false
positive rates to vary [12] by letting Λ(2, 2) be large and assigning 0 to all other entries in Λ.
As a result of the flexible procedure, group-specific error rates z∗L and z∗H are identified
to minimize the generalized loss function (20). The second stage of the algorithm can then
be applied to identify a calibrated score that yields those target rates.
3.3.2 Accommodating an interval of possible k or p̄
In settings where the exact p̄ is unknown or not fixed, users can adapt our algorithm to
function for any cutoff in an interval (p̄ − ϵ, p̄ + ϵ). It can be tailored to produce scores p̂ that
are either below p̄ − ϵ or above p̄ + ϵ, so that any cutoff applied within the interval would
execute the same classifications.
In particular, we propose a couple modifications to generalize our algorithm to this setting.
We wish for anyone receiving scores above p̄ + ϵ to be classified as ŷ = 1 and anyone receiving
scores below p̄ − ϵ as ŷ = 0. Following the reasoning in Proposition 3, for such a score to be
calibrated, the associated PPV should exceed p̄ + ϵ and the NPV should exceed 1 − (p̄ − ϵ).
Therefore, the feasible region previously defined in Theorem 4 by (11) is now defined by the
points (α1, α1) ∈ S(L) ∩ S(H) that satisfy
α2
α1
≥ p̄ + ϵ
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Figure 3 Evaluating algorithm performance. In each figure, maroon represents the high-mean
group while blue represents the low-mean group. Panels (a) and (b) correspond to the criminal justice
application, showing respectively that we can eliminate error rate disparities and maintain score
calibration in COMPAS. Note that we define a true positive classification as correctly identifying
someone who would not reoffend. Panel (c) covers the credit lending application, illustrating the
empirical ROC curves from the rich feature set (opaque) and the limited feature set (translucent).
Compared to a data omission strategy, our method raises the probability that creditworthy individuals
from all education groups access loans.
This feasible region is used in Stage 1. In Stage 2, we add another constraint to specify
that no post-processed scores be assigned values inside the interval of possible cutoffs:
Tik = 0 ∀k such that pk ∈ (p̄ − ϵ, p̄ + ϵ). (22)
The rest of the procedure remains unchanged. The cost of the added flexibility is a tighter
feasible region and higher MSE of the final score.
3.3.3 Satisfying the criteria for more than two protected groups
The algorithm can be modified to satisfy the fairness criteria for multiple groups, across
multiple identifiers. First define each group as a unique combination of protected features.
Then, the feasible set of error rates is given by the intersection of each S(A) with the points
satisfying the inequalities (11) where H is the highest-mean group and L is the lowest-mean
group. Stage 1 of the algorithm proceeds to find the optimal set of error rates in that feasible
region. Stage 2 proceeds as usual, implementing a separate program for each group.
4 Empirical Results
Let us take our procedure to data. In the first application, we post-process real COMPAS
scores to demonstrate that risk assessments can be designed to output both calibrated risk
scores as well as binary risk summaries satisfying equal error rates. Afterwards, we design a
risk score to aid a lender’s classification task to authorize loans, showing that it outperforms
a common alternative strategy based on the omission of sensitive features. For interested
readers, extensive detail about each application is presented in our online appendix [23].
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4.1 Predicting criminal recidivism
Our procedure can design risk assessments that output both calibrated scores as well as
binary “high” or “low” risk summaries satisfying equal error rates. We illustrate this in
our first application, where we modify real criminal justice risk scores from COMPAS. As
noted earlier, a ProPublica investigation showed that current COMPAS scores yield error
imbalances across race, although they satisfy predictive parity overall [2, 1].
To check whether we can correct COMPAS error imbalances without sacrificing score
calibration, we applied our post-processing technique to Broward County risk scores made
public by ProPublica [16]. We define the outcome of interest as recidivism within two years,
and we convert existing COMPAS scores that range from [1, 10] to probabilities in [0, 1]. We
define the classification cutoff as the minimum score of defendants classified as “high risk” in
COMPAS, according to ProPublica’s influential analysis [17]. This corresponds to a cutoff of
p̄ = 0.54 and loss parameter k = 1.17.
We compute the feasible region of achievable error rates according to Stage 1 of our
algorithm and identify the loss-minimizing pair, as depicted in Figure 3a. Then, we use
Stage 2 to post-process the COMPAS scores to achieve new calibrated scores yielding that
optimal pair of error rates. The calibration of our scores is depicted in Figure 3b, where
we group together by race defendants with the same post-processed scores and show that
their corresponding recidivism outcomes lie on the main diagonal. Overall, our procedure
eliminates the reported error disparities across racial groups (Figure 3a) while also preserving
calibration (Figure 3b).
4.2 Predicting loan repayment
We next present an example of designing a risk score to inform a credit lender’s approvals of
loan applicants. Our goal is to deliver to the lender calibrated scores for applications from
two groups—one highly educated (H) and another less educated (L)—while ensuring that
they yield classifications with equal group TPRs at the lender cutoff. That way, we know
that qualified applicants will have the same probability of receiving a loan regardless of their
education level. We suppose the lender in question views defaulting as highly costly and only
authorizes loans to individuals with calibrated scores greater than ≈ .9, corresponding to
loss parameter k = 10.
We simulate this scenario by applying our algorithm to the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), a nationally-representative survey of the civilian population spanning
multiple years [25]. We select as our outcome the ability to pay rent, mortgage, and utilities
in 2016, and predict that outcome using survey responses from two years prior. We label
individuals with at most a secondary school education as L and those with higher education
as H.
The full dataset contains over 1,800 features spanning detailed financial variables (includ-
ing work history, assets, and debts), as well as sensitive features (including demographic
information). We apply our algorithm to the full feature set and derive calibrated scores that
yield equal TPRs at the lender’s cutoff, using our algorithm extension that allows FPRs to
vary. Then, we compare its performance to two accuracy-maximizing procedures: one based
on the full feature set, and another commonly-practiced approach based on the omission of
sensitive features. The results are summarized numerically in Table 1 and graphically in
Figure 3c. Compared to prediction on all features and no post-processing, our algorithm
raises the TPR of L and lowers that of H, while raising lender loss. Meanwhile, compared
to the commonly used data omission strategy, our algorithm raises the probabilities that
creditworthy applicants from both education groups are granted loans, and lowers loss for
the lender.
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Table 1 Application to credit lending. Row [1] is based on raw scores. Row [2] summarizes
the classifier that minimizes lender loss subject to equal true positive rates, given by the equal
opportunity algorithm in Hardt et al. (2016). Row [3] summarizes our algorithm, which produces
a calibrated score corresponding to equal true positive rate classifications; since it retrieves the
same error rates as row [2], we see there is no added loss from enforcing score calibration. Row [4]
summarizes the scores from the alternative procedure that omits sensitive features, displaying greater
loss for the lender, lower true positive rates for both groups, and substantial error disparities across
groups.
Algorithmic Target Lender Loss TPR (H/L) FPR (H/L) Score MSE
Trained on all features
[1] Accuracy Maximizing .517 (.795/.661) (.341/.255) .072
[2] Eq. TPR Only .532 (.727/.727) (.299/.339) N/A
[3] *Eq. TPR + Calibration* .532 (.727/.727) (.299/.339) .073
Trained on limited features
[4] Accuracy Maximizing .591 (.603/.518) (.202/.230) .077
5 Conclusion
Decision-makers stand to benefit from algorithmic predictions. This paper studies fair predic-
tion in the widespread setting in which a risk score is constructed to aid their classification
tasks. We prove that it is possible to construct calibrated scores that lead to equal error
rate classifications at group-blind cutoffs. We characterize exactly when it is possible and
propose an algorithm that produces the most accurate score satisfying the fairness criteria
and minimizing the decision-maker’s errors. Compared to a commonly practiced strategy of
omitting sensitive data, we show that our algorithm can produce scores that enhance both
efficiency and equity.
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A Appendix
A.1 Addendum to Theorem 1
Addendum. We relax condition (iii) of Theorem 1 and replace it with the weaker condition
that Var(Y |Z) > ϵ almost surely. This will correspond to the assumption that Y cannot be
perfectly predicted from any realization of Z.
We will make use of the criterion that Borel random variables R and R′ are independent
conditional on Σ iff for all bounded, continuous f and g we have
E[f(R)g(R′)|Σ] = E[f(R)|Σ]E[g(R′)|Σ].
Now suppose that (Z, A, Y ) are known to satisfy Theorem 1 conditions (i) and (ii), and
that Var(Y |Z) > 0. Then let η be a Ber(ε) random variable independent of (Z, A, Y ). We
consider a variable Aη that takes value A with probability 1 − ε and otherwise flips the
variable A with probability ε, that is,
Aη = A + η (mod 2).
This gives us a triple (Z, Aη, Y ) that satisfies E[A|Z] ∈ (0, 1) and E[Y |A, Z] ∈ (0, 1) almost
surely by construction, corresponding to condition (iii) from the Theorem. We can also show
that the triple satisfies the other two conditions. For instance, to show that condition (i)
holds, let S be an arbitrary set such that S ∈ σ(Z).
We will use the fact that any σ(Z)-measurable random variable V and any random
variable U satisfy E[E[U |Z]V ] = E[UV ]. In particular,
E [E[f(Aη)g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] = E [f(Aη)g(Y )1Z∈S ] , (S ∈ σ(Z))
= E(A,Z,Y ) [Eη[f(Aη)]g(Y )1Z∈S ] , (η ⊥⊥ (A, Y, Z))
= E(A,Z,Y ) [E[Eη[f(Aη)]g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] , (S ∈ σ(Z))
= E(A,Z,Y ) [E[Eη[f(Aη)]|Z]E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] , (Y ⊥⊥ A | Z)
= E(A,Z,Y ) [Eη[f(Aη)]E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ]
= E [f(Aη)E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] , (η ⊥⊥ (A, Y, Z))
= E [E[f(Aη)|Z]E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] ,
where the last step follows since E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S is Z-measurable.
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Because S was arbitrary and both E[f(Aη)|Z]E[g(Y )|Z] and E[f(Aη)g(Y )|Z] are σ(Z)-
measurable, we can conclude that E[f(Aη)|Z]E[g(Y )|Z] = E[f(Aη)g(Y )|Z] almost surely so
(i) is satisfied. A very similar argument shows that (ii) holds. Therefore, by Theorem 1, Aη
is independent of (Z, Y ). Then given arbitrary bounded and continuous functions f and g,
E[f(Aη)g(Z, Y )] = E[f(Aη)]E[g(Z, Y )].
Using the fact that Aη → A as η ↓ 0 in L2(P), and that h 7→ E[h] and (h, h′) 7→ E[hh′] are
continuous in L2(P), we conclude by continuity that
E[f(A)g(Z, Y )] = E[f(A)]E[g(Z, Y )].
Since f and g were arbitrary, we have in fact shown that A is independent of (Z, Y ), as
wanted.
Thus, we have succeeded in proving the following refinement: under Theorem 1 assump-
tions (i) and (ii), if Y cannot be perfectly predicted from any realization of Z, then the
random variables A and (Y, Z) must be independent.
Since assumptions (i) and (ii) continue to hold if we condition on Z ∈ S for any S, we can
say further that if Theorem 1 conditions (i) and (ii) hold and P is the set of values of Z from
which perfect prediction is not possible, i.e. Var(Y |Z) > 0 then A and Y are independent
conditionally on Z ∈ P . ◀
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First we can prove a lemma stating that S(A) is convex. To see this, let ξ be an
independent Ber(λ) random variable. Then, by iterating expectations, one sees that
α(ŷ + ξ(ẑ − ŷ), A) = λα(ẑ, A) + (1 − λ)α(ŷ, A).
Using this convexity, we can prove the proposition. Note that the points α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A)
that make up the group-A ROC curve of p∗ describe the error rates achieved by all cutoff
classifiers based on p∗, and so they are in S(A). Meanwhile, since
α(1 − ŷ, A) = (1, 1) − α(ŷ, A),
the points (1, 1) − α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A) must also be in S(A). This corresponds to the group-A
ROC curve of the scores 1 − p∗. Any point in the convex hull of these two ROC curves can be
achieved by randomization as in the aforementioned lemma. For further details and intuition,
see Section 4 in Hardt et al. [12]. Note that Hardt et al. choose not to illustrate the feasible
region below the main diagonal as it corresponds to classifiers that are worse than random.
To show that all attainable error rates belong to this set, we use the convexity of S(A)
to note that the support points of S(A) correspond to all classifiers that yield extrema of
γ1α1(ŷ, A)+γ2α2(ŷ, A) where (γ1, γ2) are arbitrary weights. To describe these support points
tractably, we can use the result derived later in the appendix (Proposition 7) that shows that
optimal classifications can be chosen to depend on only p∗ and A, where p∗ = E[Y |X, A].
Thus the extrema of γ · α(ŷ, A) are achieved by cutoff rules f(p∗, A) = 1{p∗ ≥ c} and
f(p∗, A) = 1{p∗ < c}, giving support points⋃
c∈[0,1]
{
α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A), (1, 1) − α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A)
}
,
which as we have shown are contained in S(A). Finally, we use the fact that a convex set
containing all of its support points is equal to the convex hull of its support points. ◀
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A.3 Proof of Extension of Proposition 3
Proof. Suppose that i holds and call p̂f the fair score for which ŷ = 1{p̂f ≥ p̄} satisfies equal
error rates. Then since p̂f is calibrated,
P(Y = 1|ŷ = 1, A) = E[Y |p̂f ≥ p̄, A] = E[p̂f |p̂f ≥ p̄, A] ≥ p̄,
P(Y = 1|ŷ = 0, A) < p̄.
So in addition to satisfying equal error rates, ŷ satisfies (9) and (10), which are equivalent to
the two conditions in (8). Thus ii is a necessary condition for fairness.
Now we show the converse; ii is also sufficient for fairness. Suppose that ii holds and
let ŷf be a classifier satisfying equal error rates and (8). Choose p̂(ŷf , A) = P(Y = 1|ŷf , A).
These scores are calibrated by construction. Also, since they satisfy p̂(ŷf = 0, A) < p̄ and
p̂(ŷf = 1, A) ≥ p̄, they exactly implement the classifier ŷf at the cutoff p̄. ◀
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Building on the above extension of Proposition 3, it is enough for us to show that the
existence of the point (α1, α2) ∈ S(L) ∩ S(H) satisfying (11) is equivalent to the following:
There exists a classifier ŷ satisfying equal error rates and (8).
First note that S(L) ∩ S(H) is nonempty, since for example (0, 0) and (1, 1) are points
in both S(L) and S(H). So we can consider some arbitrary (α1, α2) that is in S(L) ∩ S(H)
and is therefore implementable by an equal error rate classifier that we call ŷe. We need to
show that ŷe satisfying the conditions in (8) ∀A is equivalent to its corresponding true and
false positive rates (α1(ŷe, A), α2(ŷe, A)) satisfying (11) ∀A. Recall that the PPV condition
in (8) required
P(Y = 1|ŷe = 1, A) ≥ p̄.
Applying Bayes’ rule to the inequality, we have
P(Y = 1|ŷe = 1, A) =
P(ŷe = 1|Y = 1, A)P(Y = 1|A)
P(ŷe = 1|A)
= α2(ŷe, A)µA
α2(ŷe, A)µA + α1(ŷe, A)(1 − µA)
≥ p̄.
After algebraic manipulation, the restriction can be written
α2(ŷe, A)
α1(ŷe, A)
≥ p̄(1 − µA)(1 − p̄)µA
= p̄(1 − p̄)βA
.
where βA ≡ µA/(1−µA). Therefore (α1(ŷe, A), α2(ŷe, A)) must satisfy the following
α2(ŷe, A)
α1(ŷe, A)
≥ p̄(1 − p̄)βA
Since βL < βH , the condition is more restrictive when A = L, giving the first condition in
(11). We next similarly transform the NPV condition in (8), recalling it requires P(Y =
0|ŷ = 0, A) > 1 − p̄. By Bayes’ rule,
P(Y = 0|ŷ = 0, A) = P(ŷ = 0|Y = 0, A)P(Y = 0|A)
P(ŷ = 0|A)
= (1 − α1(ŷ, A))(1 − µA)(1 − α1(ŷ, A))(1 − µA) + (1 − α2(ŷ, A))µA
> 1 − p̄.
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After algebraic manipulation, this becomes ∀A
(1 − α1(ŷ, A))





Since βH > βL, the most restrictive case is when A = H, giving the second condition in (11).
Note that special attention should be given to the corner solutions. At point (0, 0), the
first condition in (11) becomes irrelevant and so the second condition in (11) is necessary
and sufficient. Meanwhile at (1, 1), the second condition in (11) becomes irrelevant so the
first condition in (11) is necessary and sufficient. ◀
A.5 Proof of Corollary 5
Proof. Let F and G denote the lines for which the inequalities (11) hold with equality. That
is to say, F, G ⊂ R2 are given by
F =
{
(α1, α2) ∈ R2




(α1, α2) ∈ R2
∣∣∣∣ (1 − α1)(1 − α2) = βH(1 − p̄)p̄
}
The lines intersect at (ᾰ1, ᾰ2) given by (12). Our proof will rest on a few basic facts:
S(L) ∩ S(H) is convex, F contains (0, 0), G contains (1, 1), and both lines have positive
slope. First we prove that if ᾰ1 ≤ 0, ᾰ1 ≥ 1, or both ROC curves lie above the intersection
(ᾰ1, ᾰ2), then there exists a point (α1, α2) satisfying the feasibility conditions in Theorem 4.
Case I: 0 < ᾰ1 < 1 and (ᾰ1, ᾰ2) lies below both ROC curves. Note that increasing α2
slackens both inequalities (11). Thus, if 0 < ᾰ1 < 1 and (ᾰ1, ᾰ2) lies below both ROC curves,
there then exists a point (ᾰ1, α2) with α2 > ᾰ2 that lies on the minimum of the two ROC
curves, hence in S(H) ∩ S(L), and moreover the inequalities (11) hold at (ᾰ1, α2). This is a
feasible point.
Case II: ᾰ1 ≤ 0. On the other hand, if ᾰ1 ≤ 0, then in (0, 1) × R the line F lies strictly
above G. Then the point (0, 0) ∈ S(L) ∩ S(H) ∩ F lies above G, meaning that the second
condition in (11) holds and the point is feasible.
Case III: ᾰ1 ≥ 1. If ᾰ1 ≥ 1, then in (0, 1) × R the line G lies strictly above F . Then
the point (1, 1) ∈ S(L) ∩ S(H) ∩ G lies above F , so the first condition in (11) holds and the
point is feasible.
Finally, we prove the converse that if 0 < ᾰ1 < 1 and ᾰ2 lies above at least one of the
ROC curves, then the feasible region is empty. Let the intersection of S(L) ∩ S(H) with the
half-space above F be denoted by IF , and the intersection of S(L)∩S(H) with the half-space
above G be denoted by IG. We need to show that IF ∩ IG is empty. The argument follows
from the convexity of S(L) ∩ S(H) and the fact that both F and G have positive slopes. In
particular, due to the convexity of S(L) ∩ S(H), the positive slope of F , and the fact that
(0, 0) is in F , we know the line F must intersect the boundary of S(L) ∩ S(H) strictly to the
left of ᾰ1. Meanwhile, G must intersect the boundary of S(L) ∩ S(H) strictly to the right of
ᾰ1. Thus the rightmost point of IF lies strictly to the left of the leftmost point of IG, and
the intersection of S(L) ∩ S(H) with both half-spaces above F and G must be empty. ◀
A.6 Justification for post-processing p∗ in algorithm
First we justify post-processing the Bayes optimal p∗ to arrive at the optimal fair p̂. To do
so we adapt Proposition 5.2 from Hardt et al. [12] to our setting and prove the following
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▶ Proposition 7. For any source distribution over (Y, X, A) with Bayes optimal regressor
given by p∗(X, A) = E[Y |X, A] and loss function ℓ, there exists a predictor p̂(p∗, A) such that
(i) p̂ is an optimal predictor satisfying our fairness properties of calibration and equal error
rates. That is, E[ℓ(1p̂>p, Y )] ≤ E[ℓ(1ĝ>p, Y )] for any ĝ that satisfies the properties.
(ii) p̂ is derived from (p∗, A). In particular, it is a (possibly random) function of the random
variables (p∗, A) alone, and is independent of X conditional on (p∗, A).
Proof. To start, first note that our fairness properties of calibration and equal error rates on
a score p and classifications 1{p ≥ p̄} are “oblivious.” That is, they depend only on the joint
distribution of (Y, A, p) given the known cutoff p̄. We will show that for any arbitrary ĝ that
satisfies the fairness properties, we can construct a p̂ that also satisfies fairness, yields the
same expected loss, and is derived from (p∗, A).
Consider an arbitrary ĝ = f(X, A) satisfying the fairness properties. We can define
p̂(p∗, A) as follows: draw a vector X ′ independently from the conditional distribution of X
given the realized values of p∗ and A, and set p̂ = f(X ′, A). Note this p̂ satisfies (ii) by
construction.
To show that this p̂ satisfies the fairness properties and yields the same expected loss as
ĝ, note that since Y is binary with conditional expectation equal to the Bayes optimal p∗,
we know Y is independent of X conditional on p∗. Therefore (Y, p∗, X, A) and (Y, p∗, X ′, A)
have the same joint distribution, and so must (f(X, A), A, Y ) and (f(X ′, A), A, Y ). Since
the fairness properties are oblivious and depend only on these latter joint distributions, then
we know that as long as ĝ satisfies them then so will p̂. Finally, we can deduce that (Y, ĝ) and
(Y, p̂) also have the same joint distribution, meaning that (i) is satisfied with equality. ◀
A.7 Our algorithm as a mean-preserving contraction of scores
We observe that a calibrated score derived from another is a mean-preserving contraction.
Since the Bayes optimal p∗ that serves as input to our algorithm frequently satisfies calibration
(see Liu et al. 2019), then our post-processing method can be viewed as finding its smallest
mean preserving contraction that achieves equal error rates at the decision-maker’s cutoff.
The relationship between calibrated scores related by post-processing is characterized by
our proposition below.
▶ Proposition 8. Let pA be any calibrated score of group A, i.e. satisfying E[Y |pA] = pA for
members of A, and let p̂A = f(pA, ζ) be a score post-processed from pA that is also calibrated,
where ζ is independent of Y conditional on pA. Then, p̂A is a mean-preserving contraction
of pA, with pA = p̂A + Z and E[Z|p̂A] = 0. Conversely, any p̃A that satisfies pA = p̃A + Z
with E[Z|p̃A] = 0 is calibrated.
Proof. We first show that p̂A is a mean-preserving contraction of pA. To start, note that
the post-processed p̂A is assumed to be calibrated, so E[Y |p̂A] = p̂A. Moreover, since
p̂A = f(pA, ζ), we have σ(p̂A) ⊆ σ(pA, ζ). Therefore by the tower property of conditional
expectation,
p̂A = E[Y |p̂A] = E[E[Y |pA, ζ]|p̂A]
= E[E[Y |pA]|p̂A], (by conditional independence of ζ)
= E[pA|p̂A], (by calibration of pA).
Then pA = pA + (p̂A − E[pA|p̂A]) = p̂A + (pA − E[pA|p̂A]) where the second term is by
construction mean independent of p̂A, so p̂A is a mean-preserving contraction of pA.
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Now we show that if the score p̃A is a mean-preserving contraction of pA such that
pA = p̃A + Z for some Z satisfying E(Z|p̃A) = 0, then p̃A is calibrated. Observe that
E[pA|p̃A] = E[p̃A + Z|p̃A] = E[p̃A|p̃A] + E[Z|p̃A] = p̃A
which is sufficient to show that P̃A is calibrated. To see why, recall that pA is calibrated and
note that by the tower property of conditional expectation with σ(p̃A) ⊆ σ(pA),
E[pA|p̃A] = E[E(Y |pA)|p̃A] = E[Y |p̃A]. ◀
A.8 Justification for discretizing p∗
Our algorithm uses the discretization of p∗ to construct a linear program that maps probability
masses from p∗ to p̂. Note that even if the original p∗ is not discrete, it can easily be discretized
into N bins by taking p′ = ⌊Np∗⌋/N. The discretized score will satisfy |p′ − p∗| ≤ N−1
almost surely, so for large values of N , the discretization p′ approximates p∗ well.
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